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I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund),1 was called a welfare and relief act for law-
yers, even before its enactment.' One of the legal lacunae in which resides untold
billable hours has been the search for the deep pocket to pay for or perform reme-
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
1.42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. 126 CONG. REc. H 11792 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in I A Legislative History of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund) ["Legis. Hist."], 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 788-89 (1983); see also 132 CONG. REc. H9573 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Sny-
der).
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dial actions which the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) se-
lects for contaminated facilities within the Superfund program.
Under CERCLA, the conventional potentially responsible party (PRP) search
begins with the past and present owners and operators of a contaminated facility,
the generators of the waste disposed of there, and any transporters who may have
selected the facility for disposal. 4 Where the disposal occurred decades ago, dead
ends are common. The residents or businesses who by happenstance now own the
old plant site may have limited assets. The former operator may be dissolved or
defunct - and its equity distributed to stockholders decades ago. Other generators
or transporters may not even be implicated because the operators disposed of their
own wastes at their own facility.
For example, a number of contaminated sites which have made their way into
the Superfund universe first became contaminated in the early twentieth century
before natural gas and electricity were widely available.' Utilities then sometimes
gasified coal for illumination; a byproduct of gasification was "coal tar." This ma-
terial, now deemed hazardous under the statute, was variously disposed, often at
the generating facility. Over the years, such facilities often were bought and sold,
subdivided and used for many purposes. The utility may have become defunct or
sold its gas operations after electricity became the fuel of choice. In short, the
tracks of those entities factually responsible for the contamination dissipated.
How may the PRP search then continue? A corporation which has completely
wound down and distributed its assets usually cannot be held liable.' Such a cor-
poration no longer has the capacity to be sued. The environmental prosecutor's
answer often is to search for the new owners of the old assets of the unreachable
(yet liable) company. The search for a nexus between the defendant and the facil-
ity becomes a search for a nexus between the defendant and a PRP who once had a
nexus to the facility. Given the difficulty, indeed probable impossibility, of follow-
ing the equity once a business had "cashed out," the prosecutor follows the sold
assets and seeks to impose successor liability on that entity.
3. Many CERCLA cases provide descriptions of the CERCLA enforcement regime. E.g., United States v.
Aceto Agricultural Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988); Solid States Circuits, Inc. v. EPA, 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
4. See generally U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, PRP SEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE FOR SITES IN
THE SUPERFUND REMEDIAL PROGRAM, (June 29, 1989) (OSWER Directive No. 9834. 3-2a), at 13 reprinted in
American Bar Association, Hazardous Waste and Superfund 89, 107 (1990) (advising search manager to consult
with Assistant Regional Counsel when confronted with bankruptcy, dissolution, or successorship situation).
5. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (plant operated until 1950); Allied Corp. v.
Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F.
Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989) (coal plant operated from 1907-1950); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 606 F.
Supp. 412 (D. Minn. 1985) (plant in operation 1917-1972). This author has been told confidentially of one Su-
perfund site where "coal tar" contamination dates back before the "Late Unpleasantness" of 1861-65. Since the
Federal Army actually operated the site (on southern soil) during a portion of that conflict, the United States
itself may be a PRP.
6. See Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (corporation dis-
solved nine years before CERCLA's enactment cannot be sued in contribution); United States v. Distler, 741 F.
Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (no CERCLA cause of action against dissolved company); but see United States v.
Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (D. Utah 1987) (cause of action available where dissolved compa-
ny's "funeral still going on").
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This article describes the EPA's attempt to develop a legal basis for imposing
liability on asset purchasers. Part II introduces CERCLA and describes how the
EPA in the 1980's deliberately sought in CERCLA litigation to build upon novel
doctrines which had developed under product liability law.7 The personal injury
plaintiffs' bar preceded the environmental prosecutor in the quest to expand corpo-
rate successor liability.
Part III analyzes the two related doctrines which have developed in the law of
product liability, product line and continuity of enterprise, and their potential rele-
vance to the CERCLA context.8 The vast majority of American jurisdictions have
rejected these doctrines in the context of product liability. Many of the reasons
offered by the various jurisdictions have considerable force for CERCLA. Prece-
dents under federal statutes in other policy areas, upon some of which the govern-
ment has relied, also do not indicate application of the expansive doctrines under
CERCLA.
Part IV enumerates three separate approaches to the successor issue which the
United States has taken in CERCLA litigation, based on three briefs.9 The De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) seems less inclined today than in earlier years to rely on
the product line and continuity of enterprise theories. In the absence of further
congressional guidance, it is concluded that courts should limit successor liability
under CERCLA to better established bases with reference to appropriate state law
principles. 0
II. CERCLA AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Text and Legislative History
Successor liability is a form of vicarious liability in that the person held respon-
sible did not perform, desire, or directly benefit from the act causing the harm.11
CERCLA, however, is intended to impose new strict liability for the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites on those who "created the risk."12 Thus, over the past sev-
eral years the federal courts have had to struggle with the question of whether, and
if so to what extent, the statute imposes liability on corporations which acquire the
stock or assets of corporations liable under the statute.
13
7. See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24-151 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
11. See Semerano, Toward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for Hazardous Waste, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
226 (1986-87).
12. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980), reprinted in I Legis. Hist. at 308, 341 (1983).
13. There is now a considerable body of secondary literature on successor liability under CERCLA. Articles
in the Stanford Environmental Law Journal in 1986-87 make a number of arguments useful to defendants. See 6
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (1986-87). A recently published article, Squire, Ingram & Frost, Corporate Successor Liabil-
ity Under CERCLA: Who's Next? 43 Sw. L.J. 887 (1990) is, perhaps unintentionally, rather plaintiff-oriented
because it hypothesizes a developing adherence to the product line/continuity of enterprise theories which has
not, in fact, developed. Id. at 905-08 ("more states may adopt the more expansive rules so that it may be possible
to argue that they are the generally accepted rules").
1990]
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CERCLA § 107(a) identifies four limited categories of persons who are poten-
tially liable under the statute- facility owners and operators, past owners or oper-
ators at the time of disposal, and certain generators and transporters of hazardous
substances.14 The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, which
devised the four categories of potentially liable parties found in CERCLA §
107(a), explained its approach to liability as a "method of allocating resources
through choice in the market place" by imposing the costs of injuries on "the activ-
ities which caused them."15 Since the liability of the present owner and operator
was already in existence and did not need extended explanation in 1980, the exclu-
sive focus of the committee's report is its justification for imposing new strict lia-
bility on generators, transporters, and disposers of waste, i.e., those who "created
the risk."
Several courts have adopted a "plain meaning" reading of CERCLA § 107(a),
concluding that the language of this section expressly defines and limits liability. 1
Past owners of sites where no disposal took place during their ownership are not
liable.17 An intermediate possessor of hazardous substances who did not arrange
for their disposal is not liable as a generator. 18 A supplier of hazardous substances
who designs and builds a facility and trains its operators is not liable as an owner
or operator of the facility. 19
B. EPA Memorandum
The EPA announced a policy on corporate successor liability under CERCLA
in a 1984 Agency memorandum.2" The Agency's policy is to hold a successor cor-
poration liable for the liabilities of its predecessor corporation if the successor ac-
quires assets of the predecessor and continues substantially the same business
operations as the predecessor. The EPA contends that public policy consider-
ations and the legislative history of CERCLA justify the expansion of successor
corporation liability. In addition, the Department of Justice has pressed the EPA's
14.42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
15. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, reprinted in 1 Legis. Hist. 308, 341.
16. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990) ("If Congress wanted to extend
liability to parent corporations, it could have done so, and it remains free to do so."); Edward Hines Lumber Co.
v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988) ("To the point that courts could achieve more of the
legislative objectives by adding to the lists of those responsible, it is enough to respond that statutes have not only
ends but also limits.").
17. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 253-54 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (citing Cadillac
Fairview Cal. Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20376 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988)).
18. Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E. Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339, 1349-50 (E.D. Va. 1986).
19. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 861 F.2d at 156-58.
20. EPA Memorandum from Courtney Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for Abandoned Sites Under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), II (June 13, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as EPA Memorandum].
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views in CERCLA litigation.21 Although unnecessary to the holding that corpo-
rate successor liability applies under CERCLA, the Third Circuit referred to the
EPA memorandum.22 In more recent briefs, the DOJ has included a footnote at-
tempting to bootstrap the EPA's memorandum to an agency legal position entitled
to deference under the Chevron doctrine.2"
The EPA memorandum acknowledges that corporate non-successor liability is
the rule, generally subject to four traditional exceptions in corporate law. Most of
the memorandum's discussion, however, focuses on two additional exceptions,
not so well-established, which have appeared in a small number of American ju-
risdictions but which the EPA contends should apply in CERCLA cases. These
non-traditional exceptions are called (1) product line and (2) continuity of enter-
prise. The remainder of this article focuses on these novel theories of successor
liability which the EPA and the DOJ have advanced in CERCLA cases.
III. THE UNUSUAL EXCEPTIONS TO CORPORATE NON-SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The general rule is that "where one company sells or otherwise transfers all its
assets to another company, the transferee is not liable for the debts and liabilities of
the transferor."24 This principle of corporate law is accepted by the majority of
21. E.g. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. C-83-5898 (D.D. Cal., brieffiled Mar. 12, 1987). While
the DOJ pressed its product line and continuity of enterprise theories in 1984-87, some of its more recent briefs
suggest a more moderate, incremental approach. This may be partially explained by what has happened to sev-
eral of the precedents cited in the DOJ's 1987 brief. See United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. C-83-5896
(C.D. Cal., brief filed Mar. 12, 1987). One of the leading continuity of enterprise opinions, cited frequently in
the DOJ's Allied brief, is Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). In this opinion, the First
Circuit in a diversity case was "predicting" the views of the New Hampshire Supreme Court on the theory. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently rejected the approach, in effect abrogating the First Circuit's opin-
ion. Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130 N.H. 466, 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); see Conway v. White
Trucks, 885 F.2d 90 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Cyr is no longer good law in light of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's express rejection of its reasoning."). The DOJ in its Allied brief also cited a federal district court in Penn-
sylvania applying Pennsylvania law on the product line theory. This court subsequently reversed itself in the
same case. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has affirmed the latter holding. See Conway v. White
Trucks, 639 F. Supp. 160 (M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 692 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 885 F2d 90 (3d Cir.
1989). Finally, the DOJ in its Allied brief cited a 1984 federal district court diversity opinion interpreting Colo-
rado law which followed the Ray product line analysis. Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp.
1282, 1284 (D. Colo. 1984). The Tenth Circuit last year expressly rejected this district court's view of Colorado
law and disapproved the product line approach. Florom v. Elliot Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989), rehg.
denied, 879 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1989).
Apparently, the author of Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach, 58
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1300 (1990) overlooked this subsequent case law. The article cites the Cyr and Hickman
cases as if they were still good law (id. at 1317 n. 140) for the proposition that "several courts have adopted liber-
alized successor liability principles in strict product liability cases." Id. at 1317. More seriously, while citing the
minority of product liability cases endorsing the product line and continuity of enterprise theories, this Note ig-
nores entirely the overwhelming majority of decisions expressly rejecting them and their rationales.
22. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988).
23. See Anspec v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 89-2393 (6th Cir. filed Mar. 12, 1990). Under the doctrine of
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), an agency's interpreta-
tion of its own enabling statute is entitled to substantial deference where the statutory language is not clear.
24. Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781,785 (Ala. 1979).
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American jurisdictions.2" Equally well accepted are four exceptions to this gen-
eral rule. By virtue of those exceptions, a purchasing company may be liable for
the debts and liabilities of the selling corporation if any of the following four cir-
cumstances exist: (1) the transferee agrees to assume such debts or liabilities; (2)
there is a statutory or de facto consolidation of the two corporations; (3) the trans-
feree is found to be merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the
transaction was fraudulent in fact.26
A. Product Line Exception
The "product-line" exception to these generally accepted rules was created by
the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp.27 Following this approach, a
successor that continues to manufacture the same type of article as its predecessor
becomes liable "for defects in units of the same product line previously manufac-
tured" by the predecessor.28 This product line exception imposes liability where
traditional corporate law does not.29
The Ray court found this result consistent with the theory of strict liability in
tort and justified by the following factors:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiffs remedies against the original manufac-
turer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business agreement required the
predecessor to dissolve its corporate existence; (2) the successor's ability to assume
the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role; and (3) the fairness of requiring the
successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that was a burden neces-
sarily attached to the original manufacturer's goodwill being enjoyed by the succes-
sor in the continued operation of the business.30
1. Rejection of the Product Line Approach
The judicial reception to Ray has not been enthusiastic, as evidenced by the fact
that there appear to be only three jurisdictions, other than California, which have
25. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979); Bernard v. Kee Mfg.
Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 284, 328 S.E.2d 726,
727 (1985); Gonzales v. Rock Wool Eng'g & Equip. Co., 117 I11. App. 3d 435, 438-39, 453 N.E.2d 792, 795
(1983); Arthur Elevator Co. v. Grove, 236 N.W.2d 383, 391 (Iowa 1975); Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib.
Co., 209 Kan. 306, 310,496 P.2d 1308, 1311 (1972); Trenkner, Products Liability: Liability ofSuccessor Corpo-
ration for Injury or Damage Caused by Product Issued by Predecessor, 66 A.L.R.3d 824, 827 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785; Bernard, 409 So. 2d at 1049; Bullington, 254 Ga. at 284, 328
S.E.2d at727; Gonzales, 117 11. App. 3d at439,453 N.E.2d at 795; Luedecke v. Des Moines Cabinet Co., 140
Iowa 223, 226, 118 N.W., 456, 457 (1908); Comstock, 209 Kan. at 310, 496 P.2d at 1311; Flaugher v. Cone
Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d 60, 62,507 N.E.2d 331,334 (1987).
27. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
28. 19 Cal. 3d at 34,560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
29. See Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 678-82
(1983); Note, Postdissolution Product Claims and the Emerging Role of Successor Liability, 64 VA. L. REv. 861,
876-78 (1978).
30. Ray, at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82; see DeLapp v. Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa
1987).
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adopted the product line exception as their law.3' The clear majority of courts
which have squarely addressed the issue have declined the invitation to adopt the
exception." Federal courts applying the law of states which have not squarely ad-
dressed the question have been equally reluctant to adopt the doctrine.33
Courts that have opted not to incorporate the product line exception into their
jurisprudence have generally been persuaded by one or more of three rationales:
(1) the exception is inconsistent with elementary products liability principles, and
strict liability principles in particular, because it results in an imposition of liability
without a corresponding duty ;34 (2) the exception threatens small successor busi-
nesses with economic annihilation because of the difficulty involved in obtaining
insurance for defects in a predecessor's product (i.e., the risk spreading justifica-
tion is invalid);3" and (3) the exception is essentially a radical change in the princi-
ples of corporate law and, as such, should be left to legislative action. 36 Although
sometimes differing in their primary rationale for rejecting the product line excep-
tion, these courts uniformly find the logic of Ray unpersuasive.37
In Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., " the Third Circuit addressed the product line
issue in its capacity as the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands . In rejecting the
product line exception, this court made reference to all three of the generally used
explanations for its rejection. Attacking "inconsistencies in the arguments" of
31. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co.,
290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368
(1984). Although a panel of the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted the product line theory, relying on the need
to provide recovery for victims, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet passed on the issue. Conway v.
White Truck, 885 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1989); Polius, 802 F.2d at 79. See Light, Liability andthe Corporate Form
Under the Environmental Laws, 17 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIGATION 199 (Jan. 1989).
32. See Bernard, 409 So. 2d at 1049-51; Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 285, 328 S.E. 2d 726,
728 (1985); Gonzales, 117 111. App. 3d at 440, 453 N.E.2d at 796; Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. 448,
575 A.2d 758,762 (1990); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., Ill Mich. App. 343,355-56, 314 N.W.2d 614,
620 (1981); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 1989); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co.,
709 S.W.2d 927, 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 729-30, 320
N.W.2d 481, 484 (1982); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130 N.H. 466, 543 A.2d 407, 408 (1988);
Schumacher v. Richards Shear, Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 246-47, 451 N.E.2d 195, 198-99, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437,
440-41 (1983); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods. Inc., 347 N.W. 2d 118, 123-25 (N.D. 1984); Flaugher,
30 Ohio St. at 66-67, 507 N.E.2d at 337; Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P2d 953, 954 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985);
Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515,520-21 (S.D. 1986); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works,
Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 291-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 307-08, 479
A.2d 126, 127 (1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 303-11, 376 N.W.2d 820, 826-29 (1985).
See also Southwest Distrib. Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 90 N.M. 502, 565 P.2d 1019 (1977).
33. E.g., Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law); Conn v. Fales Div.
of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky law); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645
F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 198 1) (applying Missouri law); Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp.,
728 E Supp. 1506 (D. Or. 1990) (applying Oregon law); Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F Supp. 987 (D.
Md. 1988) (apply Maryland law); Fehl v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939 (D. Del. 1977) (applying Delaware
law).
34. E.g., Downtowner, Inc., 347 N.W.2d at 123; Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 104
Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1146-51,433 N.E.2d 1104, 1108-10 (1982).
35. E.g., Bernard, 409 So.2d at 1049-50.
36. E.g., Flaugher, 30 Ohio St. at 66-67, 507 N.E.2d at 337; cf Miller, 83 Md. App. 448, 575 A.2d 758.
37. See Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 100; DeLapp, 417 N.W.2d 219, 220-21 (Iowa 1987).
38. 802 F2d 75 (3d Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 79-80.
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those advocating the product line exception, the court first explained that elimina-
tion of proof of negligence in product liability claims under Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A "does not logically support expansion of liability against successor
corporations merely because the primary tortfeasor is no longer available to pay
thejudgment." 0 The Restatement requires the plaintiff to prove that the manufac-
turer caused the injury.
Second, the court noted that the notion of "risk spreading" had little to do with
the special circumstances of product liability suits. Instead, when viewed in the
successor liability context, the "real difference" between product liability and
other cases is the likely "length of time which may elapse between the precipitating
act and the plaintiffs injury."" The Third Circuit attributed the product line
courts' failure to discuss this real difference to their probable "reluctance to explore
the troublesome question of appropriate statutes of repose in products liability
cases, a question within the traditional legislative sphere."42 In other words, the
Third Circuit suggested that the legislature was better capable of addressing the
"real" problem directly through modification of the statutes of repose than the
court could through creation of successor liability. The court also noted that
whether "state corporate dissolution requirements should be modified to require
adequate provision for compensating creditors whose claims have not yet ac-
crued," a more general solution to the same problem was also "of that type [which]
must necessarily be undertaken by the legislature, not the courts."
4 3
More fundamentally, the Third Circuit objected to the product line exception
because it fails to sufficiently honor the traditional tort law requirement of causa-
tion. Without a requirement for proof of causation, strict liability's objective of
deterrence is not furthered." The court finally noted the potential unavailability
of insurance to cover a company's liability for a predecessor's product defects.4"
2. Narrow Application of the Product Line Approach
In the few jurisdictions which have adopted some version of the product line
theory, courts applying the doctrine have narrowed its scope.4" For example, the
Third Circuit applying Pennsylvania's version of the theory recently held that the
doctrine applies only where there has been "the virtual destruction of the plain-
tiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acqui-
sition."47 In other words, there would be no successor liability under the theory




44. Id. at 81-82 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 82.
46. Cases since Ray have noted that the application of the product line exception requires a balancing of the
risk shifting principle against the fault principle which underlies all tort law. See Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe,
Inc., 476 So. 2d 1125, 1129 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 479 So. 2d 362 (La. 1985); Hall v. Armstrong Cork,
Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 262-64, 692 P.2d 787, 791-92 (1984) (en banc).
47. Conway v. White Trucks, 885 E2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989).
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where the plaintiff failed to make any effort to assert his potentially available reme-
dies in bankruptcy or in a pending lawsuit against the original manufacturer. This
prerequisite is based on the Ray requirement that the asset transfer must have
caused the destruction of plaintiffs remedy."
The Ninth Circuit, interpreting California tort law, determined that for the Ray
exception to apply, the asset sale to the successor must "contribute to the destruc-
tion of the plaintiffs' remedies."49 Thus, it held that the product line exception did
not apply when the predecessor corporation sold one of its lines to a successor but
continued in business until its bankruptcy years later. Similarly, in Nelson v. Tif-
fany Industries, Inc. ,"0 the Ninth Circuit predicted that California would not per-
mit successor liability even after the predecessor totally dissolved following
bankruptcy proceedings, and the sale of its entire assets to the successor followed
the bankruptcy proceedings." In both cases, the essential element of causation
was missing since the successor's purchase of the product line did not cause the
predecessor to dissolve or deprive the plaintiffs of a source of recovery.5 2 In Nel-
son, the Ninth Circuit explained that "it was [the predecessor's] bankruptcy and
not [the alleged successor's] subsequent purchase of the assets that destroyed [the
plaintiff s] remedies."
3
The Washington Supreme Court, which has explicitly adopted the Ray formula-
tion of the product line exception, 4 held that the exception does not apply where a
sale of less than all the predecessor's assets occurs because the purchasing com-
pany cannot be deemed to have caused the destruction of plaintiffs remedy.
55
New Jersey, the only state other than California and Washington whose Supreme
Court has adopted the product line exception, has also recognized the importance
of the total destruction of plaintiffs remedy against the predecessor as a prerequi-
site for application of the product line doctrine.
5 6
B. Continuity of Enterprise Exception
1. The Turner Decision
Another deviation from traditional corporate successor liability doctrines
emerged from Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. , 5 where the Michigan Supreme
Court expanded the traditional exceptions to increase a successor's exposure in
48. See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 859 (1st Cir. 1986) (it is "crystal clear" under
Turner or Ray that deprivation of plaintiffs remedy must have occurred by virtue of the asset transfer).
49. Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. 778 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 538.
52. Conway, 885 F2d at 95.
53. 778 F.2d at 537.
54. See Martin, 102 Wash. 2d 581,616, 689 P.2d 368, 388.
55. See Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 258, 266, 692 P.2d 787, 792 (1984) (product line exception justified by lack of
meaningful remedy caused by the successor's acquisition and destruction of the predecessor).
56. See Conway, 885 F.2d at 95-96; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 350, 431 A.2d at 820; Holloway v. State, 237 N.J.
Super. 71,77, 566 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1989).
57. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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products liability cases. The court reasoned that whether the corporate transac-
tion was an acquisition of assets for cash or a more traditional form of merger was
irrelevant from the standpoint of the injured party.
Applying that rationale, the court found a continuity of enterprise where the
successor had retained key personnel, assets, and general business operations, as
well as the company name, and had assumed liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for normal business operations. Furthermore, in
Turner the successor held itself out to the world as an effective continuation of the
seller, which had ceased operations and dissolved soon after the sale. The court
identified the following elements as "guidelines" for establishing the requisite con-
tinuity:
(1) basic continuity of the seller's enterprise, through management, personnel, phy-
sical location, assets, and general business operations; (2) dissolution of the seller
soon after the sale; (3) assumption of the seller's liabilities and obligations ordinarily
necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations; and (4)
holding itself out to the world as the continuation of the seller. 58
Cases interpreting Turner clarify that it merely requires that the totality of a trans-
action demonstrate basic enterprise continuity; every criterion need not be
present. 9
The principal difference between Turner's continuity of enterprise and the tradi-
tional mere continuation theory is that the former does not require shareholder
continuity. The case for a requirement of stockholder continuity rests on the
premise that since a corporation's fortunes ultimately affect its shareholders they
should not continue to enjoy the profits of their enterprise following its merger into
another company while escaping the predecessor's pre-merger liabilities.6"
Under the mere continuation rule, "the test is not the continuation of the busi-
ness operation but the continuation of the corporate entity."61 A continuation de-
mands "a common identity of stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence
of only one corporation at the completion of the transfer."62 In fact, a number of
58. 397 Mich. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 882. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 79 n.4 (3d Cir.
1986).
59. See, e.g., Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136, 143-44 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Haney v. Bendix
Corp,, 88 Mich. App. 747, 750-51, 279 N.W.2d 544, 546 (1979) (applying sliding scale analysis).
60. See Manh Hung Nguyen, I1l. App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (1986); see also Louisiana Pac.
Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1990) (stockholder continuity required to establish
de facto merger under CERCLA).
61. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977), quoting National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Bor-
den Co., 363 F. Supp. 978, 980 (ED. Wis. 1973). Accord Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d
1451, 1458, citing Fehl v. S.W.C. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 939, 945 (D. Del. 1977), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 154
(1 th Cir. 1985).
62. Travis, 565 F.2d at 447. Accord Polius, 802 F.2d at 84 (Mansmann, J., dissenting); BudAntle, Inc., 758
F2d at 1459; Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175 & n. 10 (5th Cir. 1985); Dayton v. Peck, Stow
& Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir.
1981); L. FuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRooucrs LIABILITY § 2.06 [2][c] (1989). The Turner dissent argued that the
analysis should focus, not on the continuation of the business operation, but on the continuation of the corporate
entity. Moreover, the plaintiff was in the same situation as any other claimant with ajudgment against a corpora-
tion that had simply dissolved, leaving nothing behind.
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courts have viewed the identity of shareholders as the "ultimate justification" for
successor corporation liability.63
Turner observes, however:
The proportionate number of shares paid out by the acquiring corporation may be
very small in a corporate assets purchase, and usually is, so that the strength of com-
monality of ownership is quite minimal. The continuity of shareholders is apt to be a
paper one, more symbolic than real. The actual owners of shares at the time of man-
ufacture of the alleged defective product and the actual owners at the time of sale of
the corporation assets may be entirely different individuals.64
One irony is that Turner and its progeny use this observation as a reason not to re-
quire continuity of shareholders in holding a "successor" corporation liable. Lack
of cost internalization in traditional corporate merger situations becomes a reason
why an expansion to other "successors" is acceptable.
In a sense, the Turner theory is narrower than product line doctrine because it
contemplates consideration of such factors as similarity in the ownership and man-
agement of the predecessor and successor entities.65 The relative importance of
the factors set forth in Turner is difficult to determine because courts emphasize
their evaluation of the "totality of the transaction" in deciding whether "the trans-
action preponderates in favor of imposing successor liability. "66
Some decisions finding continuity based successor liability emphasize whether
the successor has held itself out to the public as the predecessor, i.e. to benefit
from the predecessor's goodwill.67 The question is whether the transaction made
it possible for the successor to continue the "illusion" of continuation of the enter-
prise.68 In this sense, continuity of enterprise doctrine has been analogized to es-
toppel. The successor holding itself out as the predecessor is said to be estopped
from denying that fact.69 Holding oneself out as the predecessor, however, is nei-
ther a necessary nor a sufficient condition to establish successorship.70
The factor of whether the predecessor is available to sue is of similar signifi-
cance. Although Turner seems to require that the transferor eventually become
63. Manh Hung Nguyen, 104 111. App. 3d at 1149, 433 N.E.2d at 1110. See BudAntle, Inc., 758 F.2d at
1458-59; Dayton, 739 F.2d at 693; Tucker, 645 F.2d at 625-26 & n. 15; Travis, 565 F.2d 443 at 447; see also
Florom v. Elliott Mfg. Co., 629 E Supp. 1145, affd, 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989); Parson v. Roper Whitney
Inc., 586 F Supp. 1447 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D.
Wis. 1979); Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 E Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co.
Inc., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. 1982); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984);
Fish v. Amsted Indus. Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W2d 820 (1985).
64. Turner v. Bitumnious Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 422, 244 N.W.2d 873, 880.
65. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 346-48, 431 A.2d 811, 819 (1981) (contrasting Turner
continuity and Ray product line approaches).
66. Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 11l Mich. App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614, 619 (1981).
67. Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781,785-86 (Ala. 1979) (applying Turner approach by
analogy to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's statute); Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc., 92 Mich. App. 645,
667, 285 N.W.2d 402, 412 (1979).
68. Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346, 347 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
69. Andrews, 369 So. 2d at 785-86.
70. Pelc, I ll Mich. App. at 355, 314 N.W.2d at 619.
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defunct, 7 a transferee may be liable notwithstanding the fact that the transferor
continues to exist but operates in other fields.72 The availability of a transferor cor-
poration is simply a factor in determining continuity and is not an individual pre-
requisite to imposition of continuity based successor liability.73
2. Rejection of the Turner Approach
Many of the same courts which considered and rejected the product line ap-
proach have also rejected the Turner approach.74 As recently explained by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, these courts have rejected Turner for three basic rea-
sons: (1) the successor corporation did not create the risk by placing the defective
product into the market; (2) any profit realized on the product is only received in a
remote way; and (3) the successor has not represented to the public the safety of
the predecessor's product.75
The Supreme Court of Nebraska summarized its reasons for rejecting Turner as
follows:
To paraphrase the language of several courts, the corporate assets purchaser, as a
successor of the manufacturer of a defective product, cannot be said to have created
the risk of a product manufactured by its predecessor, and, except in a very remote
way, does not realize the profit for the sale of a predecessor's product. Generally
speaking, the successor corporation has neither invited use of its predecessor's prod-
uct nor represented to the public that the product is safe and suitable for use...
Ordinarily, strict liability for defective products has not been imposed upon a de-
fendant corporation without some responsibility for having created or perpetuated
the defect. The question of whether or not strict liability in tort policy should be sub-
stantially altered by also changing established principles of corporate succession
transactions involves broad public policy issues which are more appropriately left to
legislative determination.76
The Supreme Court of Vermont articulated the same rationale as follows:
In our view, the arguments in support of the general rule are more persuasive: the
71. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 425-27, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976).
72. Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349, 350 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
73. Haney v. Bendix Corp., 88 Mich. App. 747, 751, 279 N.W.2d 544, 545-46 (1979).
74. Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law);
Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d at 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky law); Polius v.
Clark Equip. Co., 802 F2d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying law of the Virgin Islands); Niccum v. Hydra Tool
Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minnesota 1989) (applying Minnesota law); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co.,
211 Neb. 724, 729-30, 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (1982) (applying Nebraska law); Schumacher v. Richards Shear
Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 246-47, 451 N.E.2d 195, 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437, 440 (1983) (applying New York law);
Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods. Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (N.D. 1984) (applying North Dakota
law); Hamaker v. Kenwell Jackson Mach. Inc., 387 N.W.2d at 519 (applying South Dakota law); Ostrowski v.
Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 307-08, 479 A.2d 126, 127 (1984) (applying Vermont law); Fish v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 300-08, 376 N.W.2d 820, 824-25 (1985) (applying Wisconsin law); but see
Miller v. Nissen Corp., 83 Md. App. 448, 575 A.2d 758 (rejecting product line theory and risk spreading ration-
ale but accepting an expanded "substantial continuation" exception to corporate successor non-liability).
75. Niccum, 438 N.W.2d at 99.
76. Jones, 320 N.W.2d at 484.
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successor corporation did not create the risk or receive any benefit from the pro-
ceeds of the sale; it did not invite or solicit its use or make any representations as to
its safety; it is in no position to enhance the safety of a product already on the mar-
ket, and finally, we view the theories urged by plaintiff as a potential economic
threat to small businesses.77
In Polius, the Third Circuit also rejected "the continuity of enterprise theory be-
cause it too proposes an ill-considered extension of liability to an entity having no
causal relationship with the harm."78 It explained:
The minority doctrines' exclusive focus on the needs of the products liability plain-
tiff encourages courts to overlook the equally valid arguments of the business world.
Predictability is vital in the corporate field. Unforeseeable alterations in successor
liability principles complicate transfers and necessarily increase transaction
costs . . . . Major economic decisions, critical to society, are best made in a cli-
mate of relative certainty and reasonable predictability ....
In short, the district court's justification approximates a rule of law that assesses
liability against a motorist because he would be indemnified by an insurance carrier
and not because of his wrongful act. Such a profound change in tort law is appropri-
ately the subject of legislation, not judicial fiat.79
C. Analysis of the Theories Under CERCLA
The EPA's memorandum is essentially a litigation position and, as such, does
not address the limitations of the product line or continuity of enterprise theories
of corporate successor liability discussed above.
1. The Courts
Some courts have found it unnecessary to address, or have refused to adopt, the
EPA's novel approaches. In an unpublished order, a California district court in
United States v. Stringfellow in 1984 refused to extend the product line theory to
corporate successor liability under CERCLA as a matter of law.80 The court
found no authority in California or in the Ninth Circuit extending the product line
theory beyond products liability cases.8" In addition, the court stated that the fac-
77. Ostrowski, 479 A.2d at 127.
78. 802 F.2d at 82; but see Miller, 575 A.2d at 761 n.3 (accepting the view of the dissent in Polius that the
continuity of enterprise doctrine is "tacitly extant" in the strict liability regime of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965)).
79. 802 F.2d at 83. In Polius, it was not even clear whether the continuity of enterprise theory would impose
liability. The successor did not purchase all of the predecessor's assets, or even most of them. No continuity of
officers existed after the sale and no stock was used in payment. At the time of the accident, the successor was no
longer manufacturing the product at issue and had not held itself out to the world as a continuation of the prede-
cessor. The successor had also specifically disclaimed responsibility for product claims.
80. United States v. Stringfellow, No. CV-83-2501 -MML (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1984) (cited in Barnard, EPA's
Policy of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78, n. 135 (1986-87) (order denying
motion and cross-motion for summary judgment) (in 1971, the successor purchased the assets of the predeces-
sor, a manufacturer of lead who had shipped hazardous wastes to the Stringfellow site). Id. at 1-2.
81. Id. at 4.
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tors motivating the Ray court to extend corporate successor liability in the prod-
ucts liability area, such as the plaintiffs loss of a remedy and the successor's ability
to spread the risk, were not compelling in this CERCLA action.82 Although the
court refused to hold the successor liable under the product line theory, it did not
preclude the imposition of successor liability under either the implied or express
assumption of liabilities exception or the mere continuation exception to the tradi-
tional rule." In 1987, the United States once again advocated the product line ap-
proach in a United States District Court in California. In United States v. Allied
Chemical Corp. ,' the district court again refused to adopt the product line theory
in an unpublished order.
Two more recent cases have been more favorable to the government. In late
1989, a North Carolina district court adopted what it called a "substantial continu-
ity" test for determination of successor liability.8" Citing a key federal labor law
precedent, the court determined substantial continuity with reference to the fol-
lowing factors: "whether the business of both employers was the same, whether
the employees of the new company were doing the same job, and whether the new
company produced the same product for essentially the same customers."86 The
result in the case might well have been the same upon application of a more tradi-
tional mere continuation test, however, since the stockholders of the successor
were the predecessor owner's children and the predecessor owner maintained ac-
tual control of the successor.87
Early this year, another federal district court agreed with the government's ar-
gument in United States v. Distler. 88 The Distler court apparently agreed that broad
successor liability promotes cost internalization, stating:
The company retained essentially the same employees and management. The com-
pany operated out of the same physical facilities and produced the same product line
after the transfer as before. The company held itself out to the public as the same
company, retained the same operating assets and succeeded to all liabilities neces-
sary for the orderly transition of ownership and to prevent the interruption of the
daily business operation.89
82. Id. at 5. The district court reasoned that:
[Wiithout successor liability, plaintiff would have no remedy. In the instant case, plaintiffs have sued
thirty other defendants. Second, plaintiffs allege that, like the successor in Alad, Quemetco [the succes-
sor here] can 'spread the cost of liability, by passing on the cost as price increases to lead customers.
However, the declaration ... states that 'since the price Quemetco receives for the lead . . . is deter-
mined by world markets, Quemetco cannot increase the price of lead it sells to recover any amounts it is
forced to pay to clean up the Site.'
Id.
83. Id. at 3-4.
84. No. C-83-5898 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
85. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. N.C. 1989).
86. Id. at 1039.
87. Id.
88. 741 F Supp. 637 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
89. Id. at 643.
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The pendulum swung against the government in late August in a Delaware dis-
trict court.90 There, the United States pressed its continuity of enterprise theory in
a situation where the mere continuation approach favored the defendant. That is,
there was no continuity of shareholders or directors between the "predecessor"
and the acquiring company. Relying on cases which had rejected the Turner ap-
proach,91 the court found that "it would be an undue expansion of this [mere con-
tinuation] exception" to find successor liability in the absence of such continuity."
In September, a Minnesota district court similarly declined the invitation to adopt
what it termed "the continuing business enterprise version of the mere continua-
tion exception," noting that the theory remains a minority position in the United
States.93
The other CERCLA cases to mention the product line or continuity of enter-
prise theories have not seen the need to analyze the theories in detail because of
the particular facts in those specific cases." For example, in July of this year, the
Ninth Circuit mentioned the continuity of enterprise approach in Louisiana Pa-
cific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc. " Without deciding whether the approach might ever
be applied under CERCLA, it decided that two prerequisites of the theory were
not present in the case before it. First, the alleged successor had no notice of the
predecessor's potential CERCLA liability when it concluded its assets purchase.
96
Second, the successor had not continued the business which had resulted in the
disposal at issue. 97 In these respects, the case was unlike the Ninth Circuit's pre-
vious decision in Oner II, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 8
90. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. (D. Del. Aug. 28, 1990) (LEXIS 11506).
91. E.g., id. at *19 (citing Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1981)).
92. Id.
93. Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 1990 U.S. Dist. *11 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 1990) (LEXIS
15115).
94. See, e.g., Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979); New Jersey D.O.T. v. P.S.C. Resources,
175 N.J. Super. 447, 450,419 A.2d 1151, 1152 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
95. 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (unnecessary to address product line theory since it was not raised by par-
ties below; unnecessary to address business continuity theory since it would not apply on facts of case).
96. Id. at 1265-66. In late October, the district court in United States v. Western Processing Co., 1990 U.S.
Dist. (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 1990) (LEXIS 16256), on a motion for summary judgment refused to dismiss a
CERCLA claim based on a substantial continuation theory. It noted that the Ninth Circuit in Louisiana Pac. did
not expressly reject the theory and that "this court has not rejected the 'product line' or 'continuing business enter-
prise' exceptions." 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *4. The court thought it "highly likely" that the purported succes-
sor had "knowledge of possible liabilities associated with hazardous waste disposal" relevant under the Ninth
Circuit's test. Id. at *5. While noting that the Ninth Circuit had "concluded that the traditional rules of successor
liability in operation in most states should govern, . . . it nevertheless found the "substantial continuity" or "con-
tinuing business enterprise" and product line tests "viable in the CERCLA context." Id. at *2. The court appar-
ently failed to recognize that the continuity of enterprise and product line exceptions are not viable in most states.
97. Id. at 1266.
98. 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979). The recent Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA:A Federal Common
Law Approach, supra note 21, argues strongly that the logic of Oner should be applied directly to EPA's enforce-
ment of CERCLA. Id. at 1333. The Note fails to point out that the Ninth Circuit which authored Oner, distin-
guished that case from the CERCLA situation in Louisiana Pac. v. Asarco. Presumably, this August 1990 Note
went to press before the July 1990 Louisiana Pac. decision was available; but see United States v. Western Proc-
essing Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 1990) (LEXIS 16256) (endorsing "substantial continuity"
theory despite Louisiana Pac.).
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in which the court had found successor liability under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), another environmental statute.
In August, an Illinois federal district court refused to grant summary judgment
on a de facto merger theory under relevant state law doctrines. The defendant con-
ceded all elements of a de facto merger except for continuity of the enterprise and
presented issues of fact regarding whether it had substantially continued the busi-
ness operations of the predecessor. Instead, it argued that it had expanded and
changed such operations, including the elimination of the predecessor's distinctive
marks on the product. Based on these disputed issues, the court denied plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on liability.99 In November, another Illinois fed-
eral district court apparently assumed that Illinois corporate successor liability
principles governed under CERCLA and dismissed claims against a purported
successor without discussion of the product line or continuity of enterprise theo-
ries.1 00
Finally just as this article was going to press in early 1991, the Sixth Circuit
decided Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 101 Rejecting both the district court's
ruling that successor liability could never be imposed under CERCLA and the
government's call for a uniform federal common law of successor liability under
the statute, the Sixth Circuit instructed the lower court to apply Michigan law on
the issue. In a concurring opinion, Judge Kennedy explained why application of
non-uniform state law principles should be favored over a judicially-created uni-
form federal common law. 102 The Sixth Circuit did not have occasion, however, to
discuss the novel product line or continuity of enterprise theories in this corporate
merger case.
2. Commentators
Commentators have argued that the weaknesses of the rationales supporting the
product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions, such as those discussed
above, carry over to the environmental area. They have also offered additional
reasons why the approaches are not appropriate to CERCLA liability.103 First, it
is argued that corporate successors have not created the risk of environmental
harm under CERCLA and do not benefit from the predecessor's previous waste
disposal practices. A successor is normally not in a position to lessen the danger
of environmental problems attributable to the predecessor's hazardous waste dis-
posal because the predecessor's conduct has been completed. If the successor it-
99. American Can Co. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11417 (N.D. I11. Aug. 30, 1990), rev'g,
American Can Co. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 1990 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 1990) (LEXIS 10999).
100. GNB Inc. v. Gould, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 1990) (LEXIS 16172).
101. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
102. Id. at *9.
103. See Barnard, EPA's Policy of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78
(1986-87).
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self contributed to the hazardous waste problem, then it would face independent
liability as a responsible party under CERCLA § 107(a). 104
In addition, extending corporate successor liability under CERCLA is incon-
sistent with the policy justifications outlined in Ray. First of all, the EPA is not
without a remedy because of the corporate transfer of assets. CERCLA specifi-
cally provides for a fund to cover situations where there are no liable parties under
the Act or where reimbursement from liable parties is inadequate. As between an
entirely innocent successor and the Superfund, paid for in the main by the oil, pet-
rochemical, and other industry,1"' it seems more equitable and consistent with the
purpose of making the "polluters" pay to have the congressionally designated class
of polluters pay, rather than someone unrelated to the risk.
Secondly, corporate successors are not likely to be able to obtain insurance at a
reasonable cost to cover the CERCLA risk because the risk may involve the hid-
den environmental liabilities of its predecessor."0 6 Finally, the successor often
does not benefit from any of the predecessor's goodwill or reputation not ac-
counted for in the purchase price. The goodwill derives from customer lists, not
the offending conduct. A retroactive application of corporate successor liability
could be inequitable in this situation.
Commentators have also argued that Congress, not the judiciary, should be the
body to address changes to categories of potentially responsible parties under
CERCLA:
Congress is able to determine, through investigation and debate, which groups have
contributed to the hazardous waste problem and deserve responsibility for the result-
ing cleanup costs. Congress can study the societal and economic impacts that would
result from the imposition of liability on additional parties. Courts, on the other
hand, do not have the resources to conduct the necessary investigation, debate and
104.42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Some commentators unthinkingly have adopted the government's argument
that asset purchasers are in a better position to guard against damage than are citizens residing near hazardous
waste sites. E.g., Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach, supra note 21.
To the contrary, the neighbors of a hazardous waste site may be in a considerably better position to track down
past site users, e.g. through past and present site owners, than one who purchases the assets of a business which
may have used the site only a few times and then only in a distant past prior to CERCLA's enactment.
105. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-12, 4661-62.
106. See Comment, Liability Insurance Coveragefor Superfund Claims: A Modest Proposal, 53 Mo. L. REv. 290
(1988); Kelley, Insurance for Environmental Hazards: A Nutshell Summary, 67 MICH. L.J. 156 (1988); Freeman,
Tort Law Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the Insurance Crisis, 21 ToRT & INS. LJ. 517
(1986); see also Peters, Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability: A Plain Meaning Approach to the Pollution
Exclusion Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 161 (1987); but see Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patterns ofJudicial Interpre-
tation of Insurance for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RurGERS L.J. 9 (1986) (arguing that comprehensive gen-
eral liability policies of the past cover Superfund liabilities).
The recent Note, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach, supra note 21, con-
tends that the claim that CERCLA insurance is unavailable "lacks supporting data and ignores other options
available to successors, such as self-insurance, cooperative industry insurance, indemnification agreements, and
purchase price reductions." Id. at 1330 n.247. In fact, it is the Note's assertion which is without supporting data.
CERCLA insurance is unavailable. See Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d
507, 30 E.R.C. 2001 (1990) (dissenting opinion). The Note is unconvincing. Cf id. at 1329 n.238.
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analysis, for a comprehensive determination of which parties should bear liability
under CERCLA. 0 7
3. Precedents Under Federal Labor Law
Despite the impression which the Distler court's use of labor precedents in
CERCLA cases may convey, the general rule in labor cases is that a company
which purchases a business does not automatically take on the labor obligations of
the prior owner. The general rule recognizes that "a potential employer may be
willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate
structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and
nature of supervision." ' 8 In articulating its "successorship doctrine" in labor
cases, the Supreme Court has determined that the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (LMRA) 19 mandates ajudicial laissez-faire approach so that the con-
cessions made by the parties to a labor agreement will correspond to their relative
economic strengths, i.e., "economic power realities."110
The Supreme Court's general unwillingness to bind a successor company to its
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement as a matter of law led to the prolif-
eration of successorship clauses in labor agreements, in which labor and manage-
ment expressly agree by contract that any successor will be subject to the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement. In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Executive Board, 11 the Court was confronted with but did not reach the question
of whether the parties to a labor contract may alter successorship liability by ex-
press agreement. Instead, it found that Howard Johnson had no obligation to arbi-
trate because there was not sufficient continuity of identity between the work
forces of the predecessor and the successor. 12 The Court held that a successor
employer is not liable unless it is a "true" successor, a factual determination turn-
ing upon a variety of factors, and most especially upon whether the new employer
retains a majority of its predecessor's employees."'
The Supreme Court's willingness to itself develop a special substantive succes-
sorship doctrine in the area of labor law rests upon the Court's understanding of
Congress' special delegation of authority to it in this area. Congress recognized
collective bargaining as a special body of law in its enactment of LMPA § 301 in
1947. 4 Section 301 provides the federal courts with jurisdiction over cases in-
volving a breach of a collective bargaining agreement. In Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,"'5 the Court interpreted the federal courts'jurisdictional grant to en-
107. Barnard, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. at 102.
108. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972).
109.29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (1988).
110. 406 U.S. at 288.
111. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
112. Id. at 262 n.9, 264-65.
113. Id. at 263-64.
114.29 U.S.C. § 185 (1980).
115. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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compass the power to fashion a federal substantive law. 16 State law is preempted
where it fails to promote national labor policy as interpreted by the federal
courts. 117 Thus, in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston118 the Court found itself free to
ignore state contract principles and required an employer to comply with the arbi-
tration provision in a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement:
While the principles of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a contract
an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective bargaining agreement
is not an ordinary contract .... 1it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate. "9
Ironically, however, in the landmark Burns decision the Supreme Court distin-
guished Wiley in part on the grounds that Wiley was decided against a background
of state law which held the surviving entity in a merger liable for the obligation of
the predecessor.12 In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB,'21 the Court clarified
that successorship cases are characterized by a "refusal to adopt a mode of analysis
requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers, consolidations, and purchases
of assets."122 Thus, it upheld the NLRB's issuance of a reinstatement and backpay
order against a bona fide successor that did not itself commit the unfair labor prac-
tice. The Court stated:
When a new employer . . . has acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and
continued, without interruption or substantial change, the predecessor's business
operations, those employees who have been retained will understandably view their
job situations as essentially unaltered. Under these circumstances, the employees
may well perceive the successor's failure to remedy the predecessor employer's un-
fair labor practices arising out of an unlawful discharge as a continuation of the pred-
ecessor's labor policies.'
23
The Court continues to use continuity of enterprise language to articulate its
successorship doctrine in labor cases. The most recent articulation of its succes-
sor liability test is found in Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB: 2"
This approach, which is primarily factual in nature and is based upon the totality of
the circumstances of a given situation, requires that the Board focus on whether the
new company has "acquired substantial assets of its predecessor and continued,
without interruption or substantial change, the predecessor's business operations."
Hence, the focus is on whether there is "substantial continuity" between the enter-
prises. Under this approach, the Board examines a number of factors: whether the
116. Id. at 456-57.
117. Id. at 457.
118. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
119. 376 U.S. at 550.
120. Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
121. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
122. Id. at 182 n.5.
123. Id. at 184.
124. 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
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business of both employers is essentially the same; whether the employees of the
new company are doing the same jobs in the same working conditions under the
same supervisors; and whether the new entity has the same production process, pro-
duces the same products, and basically has the same body of customers. In conduct-
ing the analysis, the Board keeps in mind the question whether "those employees
who have been retained will understandably view their job situations as essentially
unaltered."
121
In the labor context, the Supreme Court thus has clearly rejected prerequisites to
successor liability necessary under the more traditional state law tests. 
126
In expanding successor liability in the product liability context, the California
Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp. 127 rationalized its innovation in part based on
an analogy to Supreme Court labor law cases. It summarized its analogy as fol-
lows:
Although giving substantial weight to the general rules of state law making succes-
sion to the liabilities of an acquired going business dependent on the form and cir-
cumstances of the acquisition, the [Supreme] [C]ourt refuses to be bound by these
rules where their application would unduly thwart the public policies underlying the
applicable labor law.
1 28
The labor analogy is useful to the United States in its advocacy of an expansive
successor liability rule under CERCLA for several reasons. First, the cases are
general precedents for the proposition that federal courts may create substantive
legal rules of decision to foster the underlying policies of a federal statute. Second,
they are precedents for a federal successorship rule which may depart from state
law. Finally, the labor successorship rule refuses to find determinative the lack of
stockholder continuity between the predecessor and successor. Instead, the labor
analysis is a totality of the circumstances approach which is reminiscent of Michi-
gan's Turner continuity of enterprise approach in product liability cases. The fact
that Oner II, Inc. v. EPA129 referred to these labor precedents in establishing suc-
cessor liability under another environmental statute (FIFRA)13 ° and the Distler
court's relied on a continuity of enterprise approach demonstrate this utility.
Nevertheless, the government's labor analogy in the final analysis is not persua-
sive. First, the federal courts' authority to manufacture federal common law in the
125. Id. at 43 (citations omitted).
126. In Fall River Dyeing, the Court held:
[I]n light of the general continuity between Sterlingwale and petitioner from the perspective of the em-
ployees, we do not find determinative the differences between the two enterprises cited by petitioner.
Petitioner's change in marketing and sales appears to have had no effect on the employer-employee rela-
tionship. That petitioner did not assume Sterlingwale's liabilities or trade name also is not sufficient to
outweigh the other factors. Moreover, the mere reduction in petitioner's size, in comparison to that of
Sterlingwale does not change the nature of the company so as to defeat the employees' expectations in
continued representation by their union.
Id. at 46 n. 11. (citations omitted).
127.19 Cal. 3d 22,560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
128. 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579 (citing Howard Johnson).
129. 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979).
130.7 U.S.C. §§ 136 (1988).
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labor area is sui generis. The jurisdictional provisions of LMRA specify federal
court authority in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. There is no such
express authority in CERCLA with respect to expanding the categories of poten-
tially responsible persons in section 107. The Burns court distinguished Wiley in
part based on the specific provisions of the labor statute which applied in the two
cases. 31 Similarly in CERCLA, the scope of potentially liable persons, governed
by limiting statutory language, is distinguished from other CERCLA liability is-
sues, where Congress desired that the federal courts develop the applicable princi-
ples, i.e. the joint and several standard.132
Second, there is no support in CERCLA's language or legislative history for the
proposition that Congress intended there to be a departure from applicable state
law doctrines on successorship. The labor cases' emphasis on not disrupting the
settled expectations of employees might even be read to indicate the contrary, a
general emphasis on not disrupting commercial expectations which are based on
state law successorship principles."' 3 In the labor area, the Supreme Court has
acted to preserve expectations which would otherwise be disrupted by the sale of
an ongoing business. In the CERCLA area, the government is asking for a retro-
active abrogation of business arrangements, which would disrupt rather than con-
tinue settled expectations.
Finally, the labor cases should be distinguished on the merits. The government
argues that the underlying policies of CERCLA of risk spreading and cost inter-
nalization would be fostered by a broad successor liability rule. The rationales
provided in the above cases criticizing the product line and continuity of enterprise
rules in the product liability area apply. In the CERCLA context, successor liabil-
ity would not lead to risk spreading and cost internalization, e.g., because of lack
of insurance and lack of nexus between the liable party and the harm respectively.
4. Precedents Under Federal Tax Law
The Supreme Court has held that some questions of federal tax law, left unan-
swered by the Internal Revenue Code, are to be resolved according to state law,
while other issues are to be decided by federal common law. State law governs
131. Burns, 406 U.S. at 286.
132. E.g., contrast the "plain meaning" cases discussed supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text with United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Ohio 1983) regarding congressional intent on joint and several liability under CERCLA.
133. Compare Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (following relevant state
law principles in interpreting releases and indemnity agreements under CERCLA) with United States v. Kimbell
Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (in the absence of some clear statutory indication as to whether Congress intended
federal judges to develop their own rules or to incorporate State law where a federal statute is implicated, a court
must decide whether formulating a federal rule would be appropriate by determining (1) whether the issue re-
quires a "nationally uniform body of law," (2) whether application of State law would frustrate specific objectives
of federal programs, and (3) whether application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predi-
cated on state law.
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whether there is a property interest,134 what is the legal nature of the interest,135
and who owns it,13  but federal law governs what property is subject to 137 or ex-
empt from138 federal levy, and federal common law determines the relative prior-
ity of federal and state liens asserted against the property.139
The closest analogue to the successor liability issue in federal tax law probably
is Internal Revenue Code section 6901(a)(1)(A), which refers generally to "trans-
feree liability." 4 In Commissioner v. Stern, 141 the Court declined to develop fed-
eral decisional law to define substantive federal tax liability under the predecessor
of section 6901, section 311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Instead, the
Court construed section 311 to be a purely procedural statute providing a new pro-
cedure by which the government could collect taxes from persons to whom a tax-
payer's assets had been transferred, when that person was already liable.142 The
134. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); United States v
Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
135. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
136. The provisions of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §§ I & 3) imposing a tax on the taxable
income "of every individual" were construed in United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), to impose federal
income tax liability on the basis of ownership of the income, but state law was held controlling in determining
ownership. Turning to Louisiana law, the court ruled that a married woman domiciled in Louisiana is personally
liable for federal income tax on half the community income realized during the existence of the community, de-
spite the exercise of her statutory right of exoneration, because she has an immediate vested ownership in half of
the community income.
137. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
138. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
139. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S. 323 (1966); United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins.
Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963), conformed to 236 Ark 897, 370 S.W.2d 445 (1963); Aquilino v. United States, 363
U.S. 509 (1960); United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955);
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S.
47 (1950); Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn,
Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945). See Ludington, Annotation: The Supreme Court and the Post-Erie Federal Common
Law, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1006 (1971).
140. The section provides in relevant part:
(a) Method of collection.
The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be as-
sessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the
case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were incurred:
(1) Income, estate, and gift taxes.
(A) Transferees. The liability, at law or in equity, of transferee of property-
(i) of a taxpayer in the case of a tax imposed by subtitle A (relating to income taxes),
(ii) of a decedent in the case of a tax imposed by chapter II (relating to estate taxes), or
(iii) of a donor in the case of a tax imposed by chapter 12 (relating to gift taxes),
in respect of the tax imposed by subtitle A or B.
26 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
141. 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
142. The court said that uniformity is not always the federal policy, as exemplified by the applicability of state
law under § 70 of the Bankruptcy Act to determine what property of the bankrupt has been transferred in fraud of
creditors; that a federal decisional law displacing state statutes as determinative of liability under § 311 would be
a sharp break with the past; that Congress was aware of the use of state law when enacting the predecessor of §
311, but disclaimed any intention to make a change; that in diversity cases, the federal courts must apply state
decisional law in defining state-created rights, obligations, and duties; and that since the federal courts no longer
formulate a body of federal decisional law for the larger field of creditors' rights in diversity cases, any such effort
for the small field of actions by the government as a creditor would be necessarily episodic. Consequently, the
court ruled, the government's substantive rights against the beneficiary of a Kentucky taxpayer's life insurance
policies, for the taxpayer's unpaid income tax deficiencies, were precisely those which other creditors would
have under Kentucky law. Id. at 4 2- 4 7. See also H. REPt. No. 356 (Part 1), 69th Cong., I st Sess. 43-45 (1926).
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governing substantive law is the applicable state law. This remains the governing
principle. 43
Federal tax law thus suggests that in the absence of statutory language to the
contrary courts should follow applicable state law principles in construing a federal
statute such as CERCLA. 1" Both schemes involve situations in which the sover-
eign sues private persons for monetary relief.
D. Legislative Alternatives to Successor Liability
A major argument advanced against judicial relaxation of corporate successor
liability standards is that the matter is more appropriately resolved by the legisla-
ture rather than the judiciary.145 This raises the question of whether there are pos-
sible legislative solutions to the unavailable predecessor problem which are
preferable to broad corporate successor liability. Interestingly, the most recent re-
vision of the Model Business Corporation Act (1984) directly confronts the prob-
lem of claims which may arise after dissolution of a corporation.
The Act creates two classes of claims, known and unknown. Known claims are
"normal" claims which can be handled routinely. Unknown claims are contingent
liabilities and claims based on events occurring after dissolution.146 Any such
claim is barred unless the claimant commences a proceeding to enforce the claim
within five years after publication in a newspaper of notice of dissolution.147 The
revision addresses the latent claim problem by providing for a special five-year
limitation on claims against dissolved corporations."
One commentator has advanced several arguments to support the conclusion
that the Model Business Corporation Act approach is superior to the expanded
successor liability approaches of Turner and Ray in serving the relevant goals of
corporate and products liability law.149
First, the prolonged survival of remedy solution of section 14.07 is said to be a fairer
rule, inasmuch as it imposes liability only when the defendant corporation is the en-
143. See Edelson v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1987); Ewart v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 321 (6th
Cir. 1987); Illinois Masonic Home v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 15 (1989). The Internal Revenue Service Manual
Handbook simply states:
In the event of a corporate merger or consolidation, the successor corporation often takes all the assets
and assumes all the liabilities of the old corporations. There is nothing improper in this, but such a move
does not in any way prejudice the rights of the United States against the corporation which ceases to exist.
If such rights of the United States are not recognized, collection from the successor corporation can be
effected by the same means as discussed with respect to stockholders.
HB 57(16)0 (11)(25) 1.2 Successor Corporations.
144. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the need for
uniformity in CERCLA's liability regime might indicate a "middle of the road" uniform interpretation for CER-
CLA rather than blind adherence to otherwise applicable state law. See Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc.,
909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Mardan).
145. See supra notes 36, 79, 103 and accompanying text.
146. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 14.06 (1984).
147. Id. at § 14.07.
148. Some commentators have argued strongly that the Model Business Corporation Act approach is far prefer-
able to corporate successor liability. See Connolly, The Post-Dissolution Products Liability Claim Problem: A Stat-
utory Versus a Judicial Solution, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1279 (1987).
149. Id.
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tity that manufactured the defective product. The successor liability rules, in con-
trast, impose liability even where the defendant corporation neither caused the
plaintiffs injury nor had an opportunity to shift the burden of the liability to the
party that is at fault, the predecessor corporation. Second, the survival of remedy
provision is more consistent with the corporation goal of facilitating asset transfer-
ability. The survival of remedy solution never attaches successor liability to an asset
transfer unless the transferee voluntarily assumes successor liability as part of an as-
set transaction. Under the expanded successor liability approach, however, a corpo-
ration must sometimes choose between completing an asset transfer to which
successor liability might attach as a matter of law, and foregoing the asset transfer
completely. 150
Another commentator advocates a further revision to the Model Business Cor-
poration Act to provide an alternative method to ensure that the predecessor bears
its products liability burden. This article urges enactment of a statute further lim-
iting the ability of corporations to place their assets beyond the reach of products
claimants injured long after a product was manufactured and sold (long-tail prod-
ucts claimants). It accomplishes this by "clearly stating that the liability belongs to
the predecessor and that the predecessor must make adequate provision for that
liability before dissolution and distribution. The statute unequivocally imposes li-
ability on the predecessor unless the successor expressly agrees to assume the
predecessor's liability."
151
Both commentators counsel that courts should avoid the Ray or Turner ex-
panded successor liability rules, which do not adequately serve the goals of prod-
uct liability or corporate law. Instead, they suggest that courts should urge their
legislatures to adopt the prolonged survival of remedy approach, the best available
solution to the problem of post-dissolution product liability claims. Congress
might consider an analogous scheme for relief in the CERCLA context, which
would make considerably more economic sense than the imposition of a broad ex-
pansion of successor liability on asset purchasers.
150. Id. at 1315-16.
151. Some authorities suggest that:
[S]tatutory dissolution provisions do not preempt the common law trust fund theory, which permits cred-
itors to recover from shareholders to the extent that shareholders receive distributions in dissolution from
a corporation. The trust fund theory, however, probably provides little practical relief to the long-tail
products claimant. In all but the most closely held corporations, the difficulties and expense of identify-
ing shareholders and prosecuting multiple suits against them present insuperable barriers to utilizing this
remedy.
Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Product Liability Claimants, 72 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 17, 55 (1986). Of course, if the successor corporation is the shareholder of the predecessor at
dissolution, there is continuity of shareholders between the predecessor and the successor, and the successor is
probably liable under the mere continuation doctrine, eliminating the need to worry about the trust fund ap-
proach.
See also Conynham, Robbing the Corporate Grave: CERCLA Liability, Rule 17(b), and Post-dissolution Ca-
pacity To Be Sued, 17 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REv. 855 (1990) (advocating statutory amendment to provide for
CERCLA right of action against dissolved Corporation); Note, Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption
of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 MICH. L. REv. 131 (1989).
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IV. STRATEGIES FOR EXPANDING SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. The C & P II Approach
In United States v. Allied Chemical Corp. ,152 the United States filed a lengthy
memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion for summary judgment and in
support of its own cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, in
which it laid out its views as to why the product line and continuity of enterprise
theories of successor corporation liability should be applied under CERCLA. In
this brief, the DOJ leads off with its argument for the more advanced business con-
tinuity theories and then moves to fallback arguments which make reference to
more traditional successor liability concepts.
In the Allied case, the government sued under CERCLA for cleanup of the
Nichols Road facility in Pittsburg, California. According to the government, ESI
Chemicals, Inc. (ESI), which had purchased all the stock of Chemical & Pigment
Co. (C & P 1) in 1979, sold "substantially all" of ESI's assets to a new Chemical &
Pigment Co. (C & P II) for cash "as part of the settlement between ESI and the
Royal Bank of Canada for payment of the debts of ESI and its parent . . . ." in
1983. The cash, approximately $878,000 was paid over to the bank. The assets
included the real estate on which the Nichols Road facility was located, all of the
personal property at the facility, a contract with a sales distributor of the plant's
products, and accounts payable. The sole shareholder of C & P II, O.E. Cooper,
had been the principal shareholder and officer of C & P I prior to its acquisition by
ESI. Everett Harris had been the general manager of the Nichols Road facility
since 1963, both during the times at which Cooper owned the operating corpora-
tion and during the time which ESI had owned it. In 1987, ESI technically still
existed under California law as a "dormant corporation."
As the government notes at page thirty-eight of its forty-one page memoran-
dum, C & P II appears to be in the class of persons directly liable under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1), the present owner and operator of the chemical plant."5 3 In light of
this reality, it is difficult to understand why the government perceived a need to
press its successor theories in this case, other than that the facility was in Califor-
nia, the state which had adopted the product line approach in Ray. "4 The govern-
ment's memorandum obliquely suggests that the government's theory might be
based upon some need to hold C & P II liable for the disposal activities of C & P
1.155
152. No. C-83-5898JPV (C. D. Cal., brieffiled Mar. 12, 1987). The court in Allied ruled against the govern-
ment on its novel successorship theories. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
153. The Government also alleges that disposal of hazardous substances had taken place since C & P II ac-
quired the facility in 1983, making C & P 11 also responsible as a person owning or operating the facility at the
time of disposal under CERCLA § 107(a)(2). Brief, at 39. A footnote on the same page suggests, however, that
there may have been some weakness in the Government's factual proof of such disposal. Brief, at 39 n. ***.
154. Possibly the Government (the Navy, which operated an adjoining Naval Weapons Station) had incurred
substantial response costs prior to C & P 11's acquisition of the facility in 1983.
155. Brief, at 2, 39.
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In any event, the government's Allied brief orders its arguments from the most
advanced theory of successor liability to the narrowest. Thus, it begins with an
argument for the creation of a broad uniform federal business continuity rule
based on the underlying purposes of CERCLA. The analogies here are to the Su-
preme Court's labor cases and a two-page Ninth Circuit opinion citing the labor
cases and finding successor liability applicable under FIFRA to "facilitate enforce-
ment" of that Act. 15 6 The argument also rests on analogies to the state product line
cases in California, New Jersey, and Washington, and to a lesser extent to Michi-
gan's Turner continuity of enterprise opinion. 
157
The substance of the government's argument for a uniform federal "business
continuity" rule is found in a single paragraph without references:
If liability is imposed where buyers continue the business they purchase (for exam-
ple, through continuity in personnel, products, management, equipment, customers
and goodwill), they will then be on notice of the need to evaluate the environmental
practices of their predecessors. Encouraging such an evaluation will assure that a
company's selling price reflects the presence or absence of environmental problems,
and forward the goal of Congress that the costs of properly disposing of hazardous
substances be internalized by businesses.
1 58
The remainder of the government's brief (1) recasts this same argument as appli-
cable California law under Ray in the event the Court should decide to follow state
law rather than a uniform federal rule,"5 ' (2) argues that there are disputed issues
of material fact in the case under traditional successor theories (e.g., assumption
of liability, de facto merger, and mere continuation),6' and (3) contends that de-
fendant's summary judgment motion is premature and fails to promote judicial
economy since the government's direct liability theories would remain even if
summary judgment were granted on the traditional successor theories. 1
61
B. The Syntex Approach
In 1988, the government followed a different successor liability strategy in the
important Times Beach case in the Eastern District of Missouri. There it at-
tempted to expand successor liability in its pursuit of Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. with-
out resort to the novel, discredited doctrines described above. The government
156. Brief, at 13-15.
157. Brief, at 16-19.
158. Brief, at 21-22.
159. Brief, at 23-26.
160. Brief, at 27-37.
161. Brief, at 37-40.
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filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability which is still pending.' 2
In this unusual case, the government sued Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc., the holding
company parent, along with its subsidiary, Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. In a 1985
ruling, the district court ruled that Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. had a normal parent/
subsidiary relationship with Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. and refused to pierce the
corporate veil under CERCLA. '63
In the 1969 acquisition at issue, Hoffman-Taff never transferred any of its as-
sets to Syntex (U.S.A.). Syntex (U.S.A.) entered into an initial agreement with
Hoffman-Taff, but before the transaction was closed Syntex (U.S.A.) transferred
its interest in the agreement to a new subsidiary it had formed, Syntex Agribusi-
ness, Inc. - the classic "reverse subsidiary merger." Hoffman-Taff sold and trans-
ferred its assets to Agribusiness, and only Agribusiness. 64
The government's 1988 theory, however, argues that Syntex (U.S.A.) was a
successor to Hoffman-Taff under several "traditional" successor theories. First,
the government argues that Syntex (U.S.A.) assumed the liabilities of Hoffman-
Taff, based on (1) an SEC 20-K filing which included the assets of Hoffman-Taff
in a consolidated financial statement of Syntex Corporation, the Panamanian par-
ent of Syntex (U.S.A.); and (2) an IRS ruling letter which referred to Syntex
(U.S.A.) as the acquiring company rather than Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. Sec-
ond, the government argues that Syntex (U.S.A.) and Hoffman-Taff had a de
facto merger because (1) Hoffman-Taff management, personnel, physical loca-
tion, assets, and general business operations continued after the acquisition; (2)
Hoffman-Taff was purchased with shares of Syntex Corporation stock; (3) Hoff-
man-Taff was dissolved after its admitted successor, Agribusiness, was formed;
and (4) Syntex (U.S.A.) arranged for the transfer of assets and liabilities of Hoff-
man-Taff to its new subsidiary Agribusiness.
Third, the government argues that Syntex (U.S.A.) was a mere continuation of
Hoffman-Taff based on (1) selected excerpts from a Syntex executive's speech to
employees at the Hoffman-Taff facility; (2) the activities of a Syntex (U.S.A.)
consultant sent to Hoffman-Taff to study Hoffman-Taff in anticipation of the ac-
quisition; and (3) the review by a Syntex (U.S.A.) lawyer of two agreements be-
tween Hoffman-Taff and a company to which Hoffman-Taff proposed to lease
space and to sell equipment in its Missouri plant.
Thus, without resort to the language and concepts of the product line or conti-
nuity of enterprise approaches, DOJ attempted to radically alter the limitations of
162. United States v. Bliss, No. 84-0200-C(l), Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of
the United States of America for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability Against Syntex (U.S.A.), Inc. and Syn-
tex Agribusiness, Inc. (E.D. Mo. brieffiledJul. 20, 1988). The description of the Government's legal theories in
its motion for summary judgment are taken from Light, Liability and the Corporate Form Under the Environmen-
tal Laws, 17 CHEMICAL WASTE LITIGATION REP. 199 (Jan. 1989). The court apparently never needed to rule on
the government's motion since its claims were compromised. See United States v. Bliss133 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.
Mo. 1990) (dioxin dispute settled with EPA and Syntex Agribusiness, Inc. splitting the work and an estimated
$200 million in cleanup costs).
163. United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
164. Syntex Agribusiness did not contest that it was a successor to Hoffman-Taff under Missouri law.
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liability incident to state corporate law. Even though Syntex (U.S.A.) carefully
had structured the acquisition to preserve Hoffman-Taff as a separate company,
the government sought to expose the assets of the entire Syntex family of corpora-
tions to the liabilities of the newly-acquired company. It sought to find signifi-
cance for successor liability in "facts" which until this case carried little or no
significance on the issue. If this "successor" theory were to be adopted, there will
be no need for the government to engage a "corporate veil" analysis, or even a
product line or continuity of enterprise theory, to establish stockholder liability in
most cases. Virtually any company which has acquired the stock or the assets of
an ongoing enterprise may have unknowingly subjected its entire portfolio of hold-
ings to the liabilities of the acquired company. The government's approach to ex-
pansion of successor liability in Syntex disguises radical alternations in corporate
legal doctrines in the clothing of the "traditional" exceptions to corporate succes-
sor non-liability: assumption of liability, de facto merger, and mere continuation.
C. The Johnson Controls Approach
A recent statement of the government is its amicus brief on behalf of the appel-
lants in Anspec v. Johnson Controls, Inc."16 In this case, Anspec Company and
Hugh Montgomery (Anspec) brought a CERCLA action to recover the costs of
certain cleanup actions they incurred upon direction of the Michigan Department
of Natural Resources. Anspec sued four companies, only one of which- Ultra-
spherics, was alleged to have been responsible for disposal activities at the site.
There was no allegation that Anspec obtained, or even sought, indemnification,
representations, or warranties from Ultraspherics regarding liabilities relating to
any past activities or conditions at the site.
Several years after Anspec purchased the site from Ultraspherics, Hoover Uni-
versal, Inc. acquired Ultraspherics. Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) later acquired
Hoover Universal, Inc. Thereafter, plaintiffs alleged that Ultraspherics merged
into Hoover Group. Plaintiffs thus "believe" that JCI owns Hoover Universal,
which owns Hoover Group, the corporate successor to Ultraspherics. In an unu-
sual ruling for CERCLA cases, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' com-
plaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It looked to the plain
language of CERCLA § 107(a), which identifies the persons liable under the Act,
to dismiss the claims against JCI, Hoover Universal, and Hoover Group. In deny-
ing plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and instead granting entry of final judg-
ment permitting appeal, the alternative relief plaintiffs requested, the court also
determined that Ultraspherics "no longer existed" under applicable law. Having
dismissed the federal claims against all the defendants prior to trial, it dismissed
the pendent state claims.
Based on the government's "parent-successor" liability theories asserted in the
Times Beach case, one might have expected the government in Anspec to have ar-
gued for a similar approach to hold JCI liable. As amicus curiae, however, the
165. 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
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United States admittedly was not as intimately familiar with the facts regarding the
acquisitions at issue in the Anspec case. Moreover, the trial court appeared to have
dismissed both JCI and its subsidiaries on the sole grounds that no successor liabil-
ity exists under CERCLA. Although plaintiffs identified parent company liability
as an issue presented on appeal, it appears that the district court never reached the
question.
In light of this peculiar procedural posture, and perhaps for other strategic rea-
sons, the government in its amicus brief chose to address the narrow issue of
whether corporate successor liability under CERCLA may exist after a statutory
merger pursuant to applicable state law. While the government presented an argu-
ment that a uniform federal rule should govern successor liability issues under the
statute, it expressly noted that the court did not have to determine the outer bounds
of the concept in the case before it. Except for a cryptic footnote allusion to the
EPA Memorandum, there are no direct or indirect references to the Ray product
line or Turner continuity of enterprise approaches in the government's Anspec
brief.
The brief is similar to earlier offerings in the references to CERCLA's "reme-
dial nature" and "its goals and purposes" in the argument for a uniform federal rule
on successor liability. The government again argues that the objectives of CER-
CLA might be frustrated because successors will have less incentive to clean up
hazardous waste. They urge successor liability in order to encourage "companies
.. . to evaluate the environmental practices of corporations with whom they pro-
pose to merge."1 6 6 In eschewing the need for the Sixth Circuit to address the ques-
tion of the outer limits of successor liability under CERCLA, however, the
government in Anspec has adopted a strategy quite different from that followed in
Allied because the government has based its argument on the broad remedial pur-
poses of CERCLA instead of on the novel exceptions to the successor liability
rules. The Sixth Circuit accordingly did not address the novel product line and
continuity of enterprise theories in its opinion in the case in early 1991. It
refused, however, even to accept the government's more limited call for a uniform
federal common law approach, opting instead for incorporation of applicable state
law under the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods doctrine.167
V. CONCLUSION
In 1984, the EPA laid out an advanced litigation position for expanding the
contours of successor liability under CERCLA from that available under well-rec-
ognized doctrines.168 It set forth novel approaches which at that time had been
recognized only in a small number of American jurisdictions. Since 1984, how-
ever, the novel doctrines upon which the EPA then relied - product line and conti-
166. Amicus Brief for the United States of America, at 28, Anspec v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240
(6th Cir. 1991) (No. 89-2393).
167. Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1247-48.
168. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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nuity of enterprise- have been expressly rejected in a large number of American
jurisdictions, including several United States courts of appeal, and by a number of
commentators.
169
The reasons for this rejection are persuasive and applicable to CERCLA.
First, the imposition of liability on asset purchasers in the absence of traditional
prerequisites such as stockholder continuity violates CERCLA's policy of impos-
ing costs on those who created the risks.170 Second, the retroactive creation of
such liability will not spread the risk because corporate successors will not be able
to obtain insurance for or otherwise anticipate such hidden liabilities. 171 These un-
certainties may also discourage otherwise desirable transfers of assets. Third, this
liability represents such a marked departure from established precepts of corpo-
rate successor liability that it would be inappropriate for the courts to create it in
the absence of more express congressional direction.172
Features of CERCLA which distinguish it from the product liability situation
also counsel against these theories' application in the environmental context.
First, where a company continues to use a waste disposal site of its "predecessor,"
it is directly liable under CERCLA and there is no need for a successor rule.
173
Second, where no PRPs can be sued, the Superfund is available to pay costs; there
is no need to have the successor as a last resort.1 74 Finally, the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties would be disrupted, not preserved, if retroactive liability is im-
posed by judicial interpretation of CERCLA, unlike the collective bargaining
agreements situation under federal labor law.17 The more appropriate federal
analogy, found in "transferee" rules under the federal tax law, is to follow estab-
lished state law principles in the absence of an express contrary congressional di-
rective. 116
The policy problem which product line/continuity of enterprise doctrine seeks
to address, the absence of an available and solvent predecessor, may be addressed
more appropriately and efficiently by the legislature, e.g., through legislative
rules regarding the effect of dissolution on CERCLA liability. 7 An analysis of
recent government briefs suggests that even the prosecutors have become more re-
luctant to rely on these novel successor doctrines where opportunities under more
established principles seem available. 7 ' Courts should not adopt these novel ap-
proaches in most cases and instead, in the absence of further congressional guid-
169. See supra notes 31-45, 74-79 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 36, 79, 103, 145 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 95-97.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
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ance, should limit CERCLA to traditional bases for corporate successor liability
under relevant state law principles.

